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Abstract. Every public-key encryption scheme has to incorporate a cer-
tain amount of randomness into its ciphertexts to provide semantic security
against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). The difference between the
length of a ciphertext and the embedded message is called the ciphertext
overhead. While a generic brute-force adversary running in 2t steps gives a
theoretical lower bound of t bits on the ciphertext overhead for IND-CPA
security, the best known IND-CCA secure schemes demand roughly 2t bits
even in the random oracle model. Is the t-bit gap essential for achieving
IND-CCA security?
We close the gap by proposing an IND-CCA secure scheme whose
ciphertext overhead matches the generic lower bound up to a small con-
stant. Our scheme uses a variation of a four-round Feistel network in
the random oracle model and hence belongs to the family of OAEP-
based schemes. Maybe of independent interest is a new efficient method
to encrypt long messages exceeding the length of the permutation while
retaining the minimal overhead.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Motivation. Ever since Goldwasser and Micali introduced the concept of “prob-
abilistic encryption” [16] it is well understood that every public-key encryption
scheme has to incorporate a certain amount of randomness into their ciphertexts
in order to achieve semantic security. Thus a ciphertext c must be longer than
the embedded message m and the difference oh := |c| − |m| is called the cipher-
text overhead. In order to achieve stronger security properties, the ciphertext
overhead tends to be even larger due to the use of extended randomness or extra
integrity checking mechanisms. In this paper we are asking for the minimal pos-
sible ciphertext overhead to protect against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA security).
A Generic Lower Bound. A ciphertext overhead of oh bits means that at
most oh bits of randomness can be incorporated into a ciphertext. A brute-force
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Table 1. Upper bounds on the ciphertext overhead (up to small additive constants)
in OAEP variants for (2ε, 2−t)-adversaries. The lower bound is oh ≥ t + ε. OW: one-
wayness. SPD-OW: set partial domain one-wayness.
Scheme Ciphertext Assumption #Feistel
Overhead on TDP rounds
OAEP [4, 15] oh ≤ 3t + 2ε SPD-OW 2
OAEP+ [25] oh ≤ 3t + 2ε OW 2
PSS-E [10] oh ≤ 2t + 2ε SPD-OW 2
PSP2 S-Pad [14] oh ≤ 2t + 2ε OW 4
OAEP-3R [23] oh ≤ 2t + ε OW 3
OAEP-4X (ours) oh = t + ε OW 4
adversary in the IND-CPA experiment can exhaustively search for the random-
ness used for the challenge ciphertext. After encrypting one of the challenge
messages up to 2t times, it has an advantage of Ω(2t/2oh). Requiring the ad-
vantage to be smaller than 2−ε (and ignoring small additive constants), it must
hold that
oh ≥ t + ε .
Accordingly, t+ε bits are a lower bound on the ciphertext overhead with respect
to adversaries running in 2t steps and having a success probability of at most 2−ε,
by counting encryption as one step. (We refer to Section 2 for a more formal
treatment.) We say that the ciphertext overhead is optimal if it matches the
lower bound up to a (small) constant term, i.e., if oh ≤ t+ ε+O(1). Since every
IND-CPA adversary is also an IND-CCA adversary, the above lower bound also
applies to IND-CCA secure schemes.
For a number of schemes the ciphertext overhead primarily depends on the
size of the underlying number-theoretic primitive, which often suffers from more
sophisticated attacks. For example, ciphertexts of ElGamal-type schemes con-
tain at least one group element of overhead which must be longer than 2t + ε
bits due to the generic square-root bounds on the discrete-logarithm problem.
Hence, the ciphertext overhead of such schemes can never match the generic
lower bound.
Upper Bounds from Existing Schemes. Among the cryptosystems based
on trapdoor permutations, there are ones whose ciphertext overhead is essen-
tially independent of the size of the underlying permutation. We focus on such
schemes for the rest of the paper. An example with optimal ciphertext overhead
is the basic version of OAEP [4], which omits the zero padding and therefore
only offers IND-CPA security. Considering IND-CCA security, however, OAEP
loses its optimal ciphertext overhead as exemplified in Section 2.2. On the other
hand, concrete security proofs for existing schemes provide upper bounds on the
ciphertext overhead with which the desired level of security is attained. Table 1
summarizes the ciphertext overhead of existing schemes. Its content is discussed
in the rest of this section.
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IND-CCA Security via Validity Checking. As in OAEP, a common ap-
proach [25, 19, 21, 10, 20, 14] to achieve IND-CCA security is to attach a
deterministic validity string (such as zero-padding or a hash of the message,
etc) to the message (or the ciphertext) so that decryption can verify and re-
ject almost all invalid ciphertexts. The ciphertext overhead is thus determined
by the size of the randomness and the validity string. OAEP and the schemes
in [25, 19] require randomness of 2t+ε bits plus a validity string of t+ε bits. (See
Section 2.2 for details on how to compute these values.) Their ciphertext over-
head is thus oh = 3t+2ε. The schemes in [10, 14] have a better security reduction
and achieve oh = 2t + 2ε, which seems the best one can expect as long as en-
cryption incorporates a validity string into the ciphertexts.
Validity-free Encryption. A considerable step towards minimizing the ci-
phertext overhead was the validity-free approach introduced by Phan and
Pointcheval [22, 23]. In their scheme (called 3-round OAEP) decryption never re-
jects but returns a randomly looking message if a given ciphertext was not prop-
erly created with the encryption algorithm. Since no validity string is needed,
the ciphertext overhead only depends on the randomness. As we shall discuss
later, their security reduction however forces the ciphertext overhead to be
oh = kr = 2t + ε bits because of a “quadratic term” qhqd/2kr that appears in
the success probability of their reduction. A more recent scheme in [13] suffers
from the same problem. In summary, these schemes successfully eliminate the
validity string but instead demand an extended randomness to prove IND-CCA
security.
Encrypting long messages. The problem of getting optimal overhead be-
comes even more difficult when considering longer messages. Notice that all
above schemes limit the messages to the size of the permutation minus the
overhead. To encrypt long inputs, [4, 17] suggest to stretch the width of the
Feistel network to cover the entire message and apply the permutation only to
a part of the output. But no general and formal treatment has been given to
this methodology and it is unclear if and how it affects the ciphertext overhead.
Furthermore, for schemes that use several Feistel rounds, this approach is ex-
pensive in computation as every internal hash function has to deal with a long
input or output. A number of methods for constructing hybrid encryption are
available (e.g., [12, 8, 9, 1, 6]), but they all increase the ciphertext overhead
mainly because a one-time session-key is being encrypted.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our main contribution is an IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme
with optimal ciphertext overhead based on arbitrary family of trapdoor one-
way permutation in the random oracle model. We follow the validity-free ap-
proach of 3-round OAEP [22] but instead use a 4-round Feistel network. (See
Figure 1 in Section 3 for a diagram.) We stress that the essential difference is
not the increased number of rounds; it is rather the way we bind the message
to the randomness in the first round of the Feistel network while most of OAEP
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variants separately input the message and the randomness. (See Section 1.3 for
more intuition.)
Our contribution is mostly theoretical; Our scheme demonstrates that lower
and upper bounds on the ciphertext overhead with respect to IND-CCA security
can match up to a small additive constant in the random oracle model. The
design approach that binds the message to the randomness and the security
proof may be of technical interest, too. In practice, when implemented with
an 1024-bit RSA permutation (80-bit security), our scheme encrypts 943-bit
and longer messages while it is 863 bits for a known best scheme, which is at
most 9% increase of the message space. Though such a t-bit saving may have
limited practical impact in general, the scheme could find applications with edgy
requirements in bandwidth.
We also introduce a novel method to securely combine simple passively secure
symmetric encryption with the Feistel network to encrypt long messages while
retaining the optimal ciphertext overhead. While the construction is interesting
in that it suggests a new variant of a KEM that allows partial message recovery,
it is interesting also in a theoretical sense as it illustrates the difference in the
properties of the round functions in a 4-round Feistel network as it will be
discussed later.
1.3 Technical Overview
Achieving Optimal Overhead. We explain the technical details in 3-round
OAEP that seem to make it difficult to prove an optimal ciphertext overhead.
The extended randomness of size kr ≥ 2t + ε stems from a quadratic term
qh qd/2kr in the success probability of the security reduction. Since an adversary
running in time 2t can make at most qh ≤ 2t hash oracle queries and qd ≤ 2t
decryption queries, we must assume that qh qd ≈ (2t)2. Requiring qh qd/2kr ≤
2−ε results in kr ≥ 2t + ε.
Where does this quadratic loss in the reduction actually come from? In the
security proof, every time the simulated decryption oracle receives a ciphertext
that was not legitimately generated by asking the random oracles, it returns a
random plaintext. Later, it patches the hash table for the simulated randomness
so that the hash output looks consistent. The patching fails if the randomness
has already been asked to the random oracle. This happens with probability at
most qh/2kr since there are at most qh hash queries. Throughout the attack,
there are at most qd decryption queries and hence the error probability of the
patching is bounded by qh qd/2kr .
Our main technical contribution is to provide a security analysis for our
scheme where only linear terms of the form qh/2kr or qd/2kr appear. We over-
come the problem observed in 3-round OAEP by feeding the randomness together
with a part of the input message (say m1) into the hash function, i.e., by com-
puting H1(r ‖m1). This link between the randomness and the message allows
the reduction to partition hash queries by m1 and therefore reducing the error
probability in patching the hash table to qh,m1/2kr , where qh,m1 is the num-
ber of hash queries with respect to m1. By summing up the probabilities for
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all m1 returned from the decryption oracle, the error probability is bounded by∑
m1
qh,m1/2kr ≤ qh/2kr . The quadratic term is thus eliminated. The fourth
round of the Feistel network is then needed to cover m1.
Encrypting Long Messages. In order to encrypt long messages exceeding
the size of the permutation (while retaining the optimal overhead), we incorpo-
rate the idea of the Tag-KEM/DEM framework [1] that allows to use a simple
passively secure length-preserving symmetric cipher. The exceeding part of the
message is encrypted with the symmetric cipher whose key is derived from the
randomness used in the asymmetric part of encryption. The symmetric part is
then tied to the asymmetric part of the ciphertext by feeding it back into one
of the hash function used in the Feistel network. Conceptually, our approach is
similar to Tag-KEMs with partial ciphertext recovery [6] but in our case the
message can be directly recovered. Namely, the main part of our construction
can be used as a Tag-KEM with partial message recovery.
A concrete technical difficulty is how and where to include the feedback from
the symmetric part. Including it in the F-function (random oracle) in every
round of the 4-round Feistel network should work but may be redundant. Is it
then secure if the feedback is given only to one of the F-functions? Which one?
[24] showed that the inner two rounds have different properties than the outer
two ones. Does that also apply to our case? Our result shows that it is sufficient
to give the feedback to one of the inner two hash functions. We remark that when
including the feedback only in the outer hash functions then either our security
proof does no longer hold or there is a concrete attack. We refer to Section 3.3
for further details.
1.4 Related Work
In Other Models. [22] constructed a simple scheme with optimal ciphertext
overhead in the ideal full-domain permutation model. Looking at the construc-
tion and the security proof, however, one can see that the model is very strong
and has little difference from idealizing the encryption function itself. Recently
it is shown that ideal full-domain permutation can be constructed using random
oracles [11] but the reduction is very costly and a tight reduction needed to re-
tain the optimal overhead is highly unlikely. Note that [22] could only present a
non-optimal scheme in the random oracle model, which shows the difficulty of
achieving the optimality.
For Short Messages. Schemes based on general one-way permutations can
never offer the optimal overhead for messages shorter than the size of the permu-
tation. For the state of art in this issue, we refer to [2] which presents a scheme
that offers non-optimal but oh ≥ 2t + ε that is currently the shortest overhead
for messages of arbitrary (small) length. It is left as another open problem to
construct a scheme with optimal overhead for arbitrary message size.
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2 Lower Bound of Ciphertext Overhead
We follow the standard definition of public-key encryption PKE = (G, E ,D) and
indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and adaptive
chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). For formal definitions, we refer to the
full version [3].
2.1 General Argument
Let PKE = (G, E ,D) be a public-key encryption scheme and let M and R be
the message and randomness space associated to a public-key pk . For (pk , sk) ←
G(1k) and M ∈ M, let C(M) denote the set of ciphertexts that recover message
M . The ciphertext overhead koh with respect to k is defined by 
k
oh = |Epk (M ; r)|−
|M |. To obtain a simple form of the lower bound, we restrict ourselves to PKE
where koh is a fixed positive constant for any pk ∈ G(1k), M ∈ M and r ∈ R.
Let A be an adversary that runs in 2t steps and breaks the semantic (IND-
CPA) security of PKE with advantage at most 2−ε. To study the relation between
the adversary’s ability and the ciphertext overhead, we treat t, ε independently
from k and represent the bounds of the ciphertext overhead as a function koh(t, ε).
In the following argument, we count every encryption as one step. A launches
the following attack.
1. Given pk generated by (pk , sk) ← G(1k), pick arbitrary M0 and M1 of the
same length from M. Send (M0,M1) to the challenger and receive c∗ =
Epk (Mb) where b ← {0, 1}.
2. Repeat the following up to 2t times.
– r ← R, c = Epk (M0; r).
– If c = c∗, output b˜ = 0 and stop.
3. Output b˜ = 1.
For a string c, let p(c) denote the probability that c = Epk (M0; r) happens for
uniformly chosen r. Similarly, let p′(pk ) denote the probability that pk is selected
by G(1k). The advantage of adversary A in breaking the semantic security with
respect to pk is
AdvA,pk = |Pr[b˜ = 0 | b = 0] − Pr[b˜ = 0 | b = 1]|
= Pr[b˜ = 0 | b = 0] − 0
=
∑
c∈C(M0)
p(c)(1 − (1 − p(c))2t). (1)
Let η be the min-entropy with respect to the ciphertexts in C(M0) in bits. Since
p(c) ≥ 12η for any c ∈ C(M0),
AdvA,pk ≥
∑
c∈C(M0)
p(c)(1 − (1 − 1
2η
)2
t
) ≥ 2
t
2η
− 2
t − 1
22η
. (2)
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Since η ≤ koh, we have
AdvA(k) =
∑
pk∈G(k)
p′(pk ) · AdvA,pk
≥
∑
pk∈G(k)
p′(pk ) ·
(
2t
2koh
− 2
t − 1
22koh
)
≥ 1
2
· 2
t
2koh
. (3)
Since we require AdvA(k) ≤ 2−ε, it holds that 2−ε ≥ 12 · 2
t
2
k
oh
for t, ε ≥ 1. Thus
we have the lower bound:
koh(t, ε) ≥ t + ε − 1 . (4)
If c ← Epk (M ; r) is bijective with respect to c and r, the adversary can search r
one by one without duplication and the advantage for this case is AdvA,pk = 2
t
2η ,
which results in koh(t, ε) ≥ t + ε.
In the above discussion we used the simplified argument to count one en-
cryption as one single time unit. More generally, one should count each funda-
mental cryptographic operation (such as hashing, group operation, etc.) as one
step. Hence the value 2t is understood as the total number of times the adver-
sary performs the fundamental cryptographic operations. A precise assessment
is possible by incorporating an adequate scaling factor that represent the exact
number of steps (depending on the computational model).
2.2 Example: Ciphertext Overhead of OAEP
OAEP includes randomness of size kr and zero-padding of size kv. These parame-
ters define the ciphertext overhead as oh = kr +kv. Together with the size of per-
mutation, n, they are provided as a security parameter k = (n, kr, kv). According
to [15, Th. 1], the advantage of an adversary A against the IND-CCA security of
OAEP, making up to q decryption and hash queries is upper bounded by
AdvccaA (k) ≤ spd(n) +
c q2
2kr
+
c′q
2kv
, (5)
where spd(n) is the probability of breaking set partial one-wayness of the un-
derlying trapdoor permutation of size n, and c, c′ ≥ 1 are two (small) constants.
Consider an (2t, 2−ε) adversary that can make at most q ≤ 2t oracle queries.
Since parameter n can be chosen essentially independently from kr and kv, we
can safely assume that spd(n) is small enough. Assuming spd(n) ≤ c′′ 2−ε with
a constant 0 < c′′ ≤ 12 for concreteness, each of the remaining two terms in (5)
must be smaller than 2−ε − spd(n) ≥ (1 − c′′) 2−ε. Namely,
c 22t
2kr
≤ (1 − c′′) 2−ε and c
′2t
2kv
≤ (1 − c′′) 2−ε (6)
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Fig. 1. The diagram of (a part of) encryption. Input message is m = m1 ‖m2 ‖ me ∈
{0, 1}km1 ×{0, 1}km2 ×{0, 1}∗ and the randomness is r ∈ {0, 1}kr . The actual ciphertext
is (u, c) where u = f(t ‖ s).
must hold. Accordingly, in order to attain the desired security level, it is sufficient
to choose
kr = 2t + ε and kv = t + ε (7)
plus some small positive constants. As a result, the ciphertext overhead of OAEP
is upper bounded by
kr + kv = 3t + 2ε + O(1). (8)
3 Proposed Scheme
3.1 Description
Our construction requires a symmetric-key encryption scheme SEke = (E,D) and
a trapdoor permutation family Pn as building blocks. The symmetric encryption
scheme SE must be length-preserving and passively secure (indistinguishable
against passive attacks), and the trapdoor permutation family must be one-way.
For formal definitions, we refer to the full version [3].
Let (n, ke, kr) be a set of security parameters where n represents the bit-length
of the trapdoor permutation, ke is the key size of the symmetric-key encryption,
and kr is the size of randomness incorporated into the ciphertext. The proposed
scheme PKE = (G, E ,D) is the following. See also Figure 1 for a diagram of
encryption.
Key Generation G: Given a security parameter k = (n, ke, kr) for n ≥ 6kr,
set parameters km1 and km2 so that
km1 ≥ 2kr, km2 ≥ 3kr, n = kr + km1 + km2 (9)
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are fulfilled. Then select (f, f−1) ← Pn (the trapdoor permutation genera-
tor) and hash functions G and Hi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 such that
G : {0, 1}kr+km1 → {0, 1}ke, H1 : {0, 1}kr+km1 → {0, 1}km2 ,
H2 : {0, 1}km2 → {0, 1}kr+km1 , H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}km2 ,
H4 : {0, 1}km2 → {0, 1}kr+km1 .
The private-key is f−1. The public-key includes f , SEke , and the hash func-
tions with associated parameters.
Encryption E: Given a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}∗, first chop it into three blocks,
m1, m2, and me such that
m = m1 ‖m2 ‖me ∈ {0, 1}km1 × {0, 1}km2 × {0, 1}∗.
Then choose random r ← {0, 1}kr and compute
z = r ‖m1, w = G(z), c = Ew(me),
h1 = H1(z), v = h1 ⊕ m2, h2 = H2(v), d = h2 ⊕ z,
h3 = H3(d ‖ c), s = h3 ⊕ v, h4 = H4(s), t = h4 ⊕ d,
and u = f(t ‖ s). The ciphertext is (u, c) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗.
Decryption D: Given a ciphertext (u, c) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ke, compute y =
f−1(u) and parse y as y = t ‖ s ∈ {0, 1}kr+km1 × {0, 1}km2 . Then compute
the following values:
h4 = H4(s), d = h4 ⊕ t, h3 = H3(d ‖ c), v = h3 ⊕ s,
h2 = H2(v), z = h2 ⊕ d, h1 = H1(z), m2 = h1 ⊕ v,
w = G(z), me = Dw(c),
and parse z = r ‖m1 ∈ {0, 1}kr × {0, 1}km1 . The output is m1 ‖m2 ‖me.
3.2 Security and Optimality
The following theorems hold for PKE described in the previous section. A proof
sketch is in Section 4 and the complete proof is in [3].
Theorem 1 (Chosen Ciphertext Security). Suppose A is an adversary that
runs in time τ with at most qh hash queries and qd decryption queries. Then there
exist an adversaries B that runs in time at most τ + O(q2h) and an adversary C
that runs in time at most τ + O(1) with
AdvccaA (k) ≤ Advind-paC,SE (ke) + 2AdvowpB,P (n) + O(
qh + qd
2kr
) .
Note that the number of hash queries includes the ones made through the decryp-
tion queries. In an asymptotic sense, Theorem 1 states that the above scheme
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is semantically secure against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random
oracle model if the trapdoor permutation P is one-way and SE is passively secure.
As it is the case for most OAEP variants, our security reduction includes
a quadratic factor q2h in the running time of the adversary against the one-
way permutation. It results in demanding larger n which increases the minimal
length of the message the scheme can encrypt attaining the optimal overhead.
The approach from [19, 14] helps achieving a linear running time if desired.
Theorem 2 (Optimality in Ciphertext Overhead). If Advind-paC,SE (ke) +
2AdvowpB,P (n) ≤ 2−(ε+1) holds for all adversaries C and B running in time 2t,
then kr = oh = t + ε + 4 is sufficient for messages of size equal or larger than
n − kr bits.
Note that parameters ke and n are independent of the overhead and can be set
arbitrary to fulfill the condition.
3.3 Notes on Variations
Why Not 3 Rounds? Consider the 3-round version of our scheme obtained by
removing H4 and simply letting t = d. We show that the 3-round version is not
simulatable, at least with the technique that constructs a plaintext extractor
from the queries to the random oracles. Since the following argument holds
regardless of the presence of the extended part c, let us ignore it.
Suppose that the adversary creates two ciphertexts u and u′ by randomly
choosing t, s, t′ and computing s′ = H3(t) ⊕ s ⊕ H3(t′), u = f(t ‖ s), and u′ =
f(t′ ‖ s′). Since H3(t) ⊕ s = H3(t′) ⊕ s′, decrypting u and u′ yield the same v.
However, such a relation between u and u′ can not be detected by the simulator
since H2(v) is not asked. Accordingly the decryption oracle must return random
m1 ‖m2 and m1′ ‖m2′ to answer to the queries on u and u′, respectively. Then
the adversary asks H2(v) and obtains h2. For consistency, it must hold that
h2 = (r ‖m1) ⊕ t = (r′ ‖m1′) ⊕ t′. However, since m1 and m1′ are randomly
chosen before the simulator sees t and t′, such a relation can be fulfilled only by
chance. The adversary can notice the inconsistency by checking the relation and
the simulation should fail.
Including c Into a Hash Other than H3. We discuss on the variants that
includes c into one of the hash functions rather than H3. In summary, only the
inner two hash functions, H2 and H3, are the right choice.
– Case of H1(z ‖ c). This is clearly a wrong choice since (u∗, c∗) and (u∗, c)
yield the same m1.
– Case of H2(v ‖ c). It is possible to modify the proof of Theorem 1 to show
that this variant is also secure.
– Case of H4(s ‖ c). For this case, we can show that a (powerful) adversary can
distinguish the simulation from the reality. The underlying idea is that, given
a challenge ciphertext (u∗, c∗), the adversary builds a ciphertext (u, c) that
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yields the same plaintext without making queries to H3. Suppose that the
adversary finds (t∗, s∗). It obtains h∗4 = H4(s
∗ ‖ c∗) and d∗ = h∗4 ⊕ t∗. It then
selects arbitrary c and asks h4 = H4(s∗ ‖ c). Note that c must be different
from c∗. It further computes t = d∗ ⊕ h4 and u = f(t ‖ s∗). Observe that
(u, c) recovers d∗ and v∗ since d = t⊕H4(s∗ ‖ c) = d∗⊕h4⊕H4(s∗ ‖ c) = d∗⊕
h4 ⊕h4 = d∗ and v = s∗⊕H3(d) = s∗⊕H3(d∗) = v∗. Therefore, the selected
challenge message is returned if (u, c) is asked to the real decryption oracle.
However, since H3(d∗) has only been defined implicitly and was never directly
asked by the adversary, the simulated decryption oracle cannot detect such
a case and returns a random message which is noticed by the adversary.
4 Proofs
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Sketch)
We proceed in games. Let Xi denote the event that adversary A outputs b˜ = b
in Game i.
Game 0. The original CCA game. By definition, we have
Pr[X0] =
1
2
· AdvccaA (k) +
1
2
. (10)
Game 1. Modify the challenge oracle so that it returns random u∗ that is
independent from the challenge messages as follows.
Challenge Oracle (M0, M1).
C.1 Choose u∗ ← {0, 1}n.
C.2 Choose b ← {0, 1} and split Mb into m1∗, m2∗ and me∗, accordingly.
Then choose w∗ ← {0, 1}ke and compute c∗ = Ew∗ (me∗).
C.3 Return (u∗, c∗).
For u∗, c∗ and w∗, let (t∗, s∗, d∗, v∗, z∗, h∗4, h
∗
3, h
∗
2, h
∗
1) be a consistent internal
state. Let AskH+3 denote an event such that (d
∗ ‖ c∗) is asked to H3 after s∗ is
asked to H4. The following bound can be shown.
|Pr[X0] − Pr[X1]| ≤ qg2kr +
qh1
2kr
+
qh2
2km2
+
qh3
2kr+km1
+ Pr[AskH+3 ] (11)
It is straightforward to see that distinguishing b breaks the passive security
of the symmetric encryption since only the symmetric part is related to b in
Game 1. We thus have
Pr[X1] ≤ 12 +
1
2
· Advind-paC,SE (ke) , (12)
for some suitable adversary C that has similar running time as A.
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To bound Pr[AskH+3 ], we initiate a new series of sub-games starting from
Game 1. In the following games, each random oracle X is simulated with an
independent list LX that is initially empty. When X is first asked on fresh input
a, output b is uniformly selected and (a, b) is stored in LX . If a has been asked
before, the corresponding b is read from LX and returned. By (a, [b]) ∈ LX , we
mean that table LX includes an entry whose first element is a. If such entry
exists, the second element is denoted by b. List LX is consistent for oracle X if
every input a is unique in LX . By F1.i we denote the same event in the following
sub-games Game 1.i.
Game 1.0. This game is the same as Game 1. Since this is just a change of
notation, we have
Pr[AskH+3 ] = Pr[F1.0.] . (13)
Game 1.1. The game is modified so that it immediately stops at the moment
AskH+3 happens. To capture event AskH
+
3 , hash oracle H3 is modified so that
it checks whether the query d ‖ c equals the value d∗ ‖ c∗ by searching LH4 for
corresponding s∗.
Hash Oracle H3(d ‖ c).
A.1 If (d ‖ c, [h3]) ∈ LH3, return h3.
A.2 Choose h3 ← {0, 1}km2 and add (d ‖ c, h3) to LH3.
A.3 Repeat the following for every entry (h4, s) in LH4.
(a) Compute t = d ⊕ h4, u = f(t ‖ s).
(b) If u = u∗, abort the game. (event: F1.1.).
A.4 Return h3.
Since this modification does not change the view of the adversary unless AskH+3
happens, we have
Pr[F1.0.] = Pr[F1.1.] . (14)
Game 1.2. Modify the decryption oracle so that it returns a random message
when a decryption query is made on a ciphertext whose associated d ‖ c was not
yet asked to H3. Modify H3 for consistency, too.
Decryption Oracle D(u, c).
D.1 Compute t ‖ s = f−1(u).
D.2 h4 ← H4(s).
D.3 Let d = t⊕h4. If (d ‖ c, [h3]) ∈ LH3, go to the next step. Otherwise, return
m1 ‖m2 ‖me computed normally by using t, s, d, and h3.
D.4 Return m1 ‖ m2 ‖me computed as follows.
(a) Select m1, m2, and w uniformly and compute me = Dw(c).
(b) Add (u, c, w,m1,m2) to Lwatch .
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Hash Oracle H3(d ‖ c).
A.1 If (d ‖ c, [h3]) ∈ LH3, return h3.
A.2 Choose h3 ← {0, 1}km2 and put (d ‖ c, h3) to LH3.
A.3 Repeat the following for every entry (h4, s) in LH4.
(a) Compute t = d ⊕ h4, u = f(t ‖ s), v = h3 ⊕ s.
(b) If u = u∗, abort the game. (event: F1.2.).
(c) If (u, c, [w], [m1], [m2]) ∈ Lwatch , do as follows.
– Select r ← {0, 1}kr and compute z = r ‖ m1, h2 = d ⊕ z, h1 =
m2 ⊕ v.
– Add (z, w), (z, h1), and (v, h2) to LG, LH1, and LH2, respectively.
– Remove entry (u, c, w, m1,m2) from Lwatch .
A.4 Return h3.
The following bound can be shown.
|Pr[F1.1.] − Pr[F1.2.]| ≤ q
2
d
2km1
+
qh1 + qg
2kr
+
qh2 qd
2km2
. (15)
Game 1.3. Modify the decryption oracle so that it also returns a random mes-
sage when a decryption query is made on a ciphertext whose associated s was
not yet asked to H4.
Decryption Oracle D(u, c).
D.1 Compute t ‖ s = f−1(u).
D.2 If (s, [h4]) ∈ LH4 and (d ‖ c, [h3]) ∈ LH3 for d = t ⊕ h4, then return
m1 ‖m2 ‖me computed normally by using t, s, d, and h3.
D.3 Otherwise, return m1 ‖m2 ‖me computed as follows.
(a) Select m1, m2, and w uniformly and compute me = Dw(c).
(b) Add (u, c, w,m1,m2) to Lwatch .
The following bound can be shown.
|Pr[F1.2.] − Pr[F1.3.]| ≤ qd qh32kr+km1 . (16)
Game 1.4. Modify the decryption oracle so that it uses a lookup table instead
of computing t ‖ s = f−1(u).
Decryption Oracle D(u, c).
D.1 If (u, c, [t], [s]) ∈ LX , then continue the normal decryption procedure by
using t and s and return the obtained message.
D.2 Otherwise, return random m1 ‖ m2 ‖me computed as follows.
(a) Select m1, m2, and w uniformly and compute me = Dw(c).
(b) Add (u, c, w,m1,m2) to Lwatch and return m1 ‖m2 ‖me.
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Hash Oracle H3(d ‖ c).
A.1 If (d ‖ c, [h3]) ∈ LH3, return h3.
A.2 Choose h3 ← {0, 1}km2 and put (d ‖ c, h3) to LH3.
A.3 Repeat the following for every entry (h4, s) in LH4.
(a) Compute t = d ⊕ h4, u = f(t ‖ s), v = h3 ⊕ s.
(b) If u = u∗, abort the game with status 1 (event: F1.4.).
(c) If (u, c, [w], [m1], [m2]) ∈ Lwatch , do as follows
– Select r ← {0, 1}kr and compute z = r ‖ m1, h2 = d ⊕ z, h1 =
m2 ⊕ v.
– Add (z, w), (z, h1), and (v, h2) to LG, LH1, and LH2, respectively.
– Remove entry (u, c, w, m1,m2) from Lwatch .
(d) Put (u, c, t, s) to LX .
A.4 Return h3.
Hash Oracle H4(s).
B.1 If (s, [h4]) ∈ LH4, return h4.
B.2 Choose h4 ← {0, 1}kr+km1 and put (s, h4) to LH4.
B.3 Repeat the following for every entry ([d], [c], [h3]) in LH3.
(a) Let t = d ⊕ h4, v = s ⊕ h3, and u = f(t ‖ s).
(b) Put (u, c, t, s) to LX .
B.4 Return h4.
Since the adversary’s view is not influenced by this modification, we have
Pr[F1.3.] = Pr[F1.4.]. (17)
Game 1.4. does not use f−1 and any ∗-marked internal values at all. Challenge
u∗ is a random element in {0, 1}n, and s∗ ‖ t∗ such that f(s∗ ‖ t∗) = u∗ can be
extracted if F1.4. happens. It is thus straightforward to construct adversary B
that computes f−1 using adversary A that causes F1.4.. We thus have
Pr[F1.4.] ≤ AdvowpB,f (k) . (18)
The running time of B is bounded by that of A plus O(q2h).
From (11), (14), (16), (17), and (18), we have
AdvccaA (k) ≤ Advind-paC,SE (ke) + 2 · AdvowpB,P (n)
+
4(qh1 + qg)
2kr
+
2q2d
2km1
+
2qh2(qd + 1)
2km2
+
2qh3(qd + 1)
2kr+km1
.
Finally, using km1 ≥ 2kr, km2 ≥ 3kr and setting qh = qh1 + qh2 + qh3 + qh4 + qg,
this simplifies to the claimed form in the theorem as follows.
AdvccaA (k) ≤ Advind-paC,SE (ke) + 2 · AdvowpB,P (n) +
4qh
2kr
+
2q2d
22kr
+
2qh(qd + 1)
23kr
≤ Advind-paC,SE (ke) + 2 · AdvowpB,P (n) + O(
qh + qd
2kr
) (19)
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4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix ε and t. We require AdvccaA (k) ≤ 1/2ε for adversaries A running time in 2t.
Using the explicit bound (19) from the proof of Theorem 1, it is sufficient to set
kr so that
Advind-paC,SE (ke) + 2 · AdvowpB,P (n) +
4qh
2kr
+
2q2d
22kr
+
2qh(qd + 1)
23kr
=
1
2ε
(20)
is fulfilled. By assuming that ke and n are set to satisfy
Advind-paC,SE (ke) + 2 · AdvowpB,P (n) ≤ 1/2ε+1,
it is sufficient to choose kr such that
4qh
2kr
+
2q2d
22kr
+
2qh(qd + 1)
23kr
≤ 1
2ε+1
. (21)
To achieve semantic security, qh/2kr ≤ 1 and qd/2kr ≤ 1 must hold. Since 2t
upper bounds the running time, qh ≤ 2t and qd ≤ 2t must hold, too. By using
these bounds, the left side of (21) simplifies to
1
2kr
(4qh + 2qd + qh + 1) ≤ 8 · 2
t
2kr
. (22)
Thus we have
8 · 2t
2kr
≤ 1
2ε+1
,
which results in t+ ε+4 ≤ kr. Since oh = kr holds for all messages of size equal
or larger than n − kr bits, oh = kr = t+ ε+4 is sufficient. It matches the lower
bound up to the constant term.
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
We propose a variant of OAEP that attains an optimal overhead in the random
oracle model and thereby proved that the lower bound of ciphertext overhead is
tight even with respect to IND-CCA security. Open problems include:
– Show the bound without random oracles. In the standard model, the schemes
in [7, 18] have the shortest known ciphertext overhead consisting of two group
elements that results in oh ≥ 4t + 2ε bits. It remains as a very interesting
open question whether or not the optimality can be achieved without random
oracles.
– Optimal ciphertext overhead for shorter messages. We refer to [2] whose
(DH-based) schemes offer oh ≥ 2t + ε for short messages.
– Show that 4-round is necessary (or not) in our construction.
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